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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
HIGHWAYS-RIGHT OF ACCESS BY PRIVATE ROAD ACROSS INTERVENING
LAND--DGREE OF NECESSITY REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN RIGHT-[Kentucky].-
Plaintiff instituted proceedings to condemn a passway over defendant's
land, defendant having refused to grant an easement. The parties, adjoin-
ing land-owners, were formerly separated by a road. The state built a
new highway not following the old so that the former was entirely within
defendant's land. Plaintiff's only way of reaching the highway exclusively
ever his own land was to construct at great expense a passway one-fifth
of a mile long and entering the highway at an acute and hazardous angle.
Held for plaintiff, it being in the public interest that he be granted the
passway.'
This case shows an interesting and intelligent construction of a Kentucky
statute2 designed to alleviate the rigor of the common-law rule that no
man can have a right of way over the land of a stranger without his con-
sent.' The court in holding that the necessity contemplated by the statute
is not an absolute but a reasonable necessity followed its own earlier deei-
sion of Vice v. Eden."
In the absence of statute one seeking a passway over the land of an
unwilling adjacent landowner is forced to establish the right to a way of
necessity.5 Since ways of necessity are incident only to the grantor-grantee
relationship, it is uniformly held that there must at some time have been
unity of ownership of the dominant and servient estates to support the
-claim.6 In consequence statutes were generally adopted providing for pri-
vate roads and ways. The courts split sharply as to the constitutionality
-of these statutes, some feeling that they sought to authorize the taking of
private property for a private use s others upholding them on the ground
that the taking was really for a public use because the public can use such
roads and ways. 9
1. Peery v. Hill (Ky. 1938) 120 S. W. (2d) 762.
2. Ky. Carroll's Stats. Anno. (Baldwin's Rev. 1936) sec. 3779a-1. The
statute provides that whenever it is necessary for a person to have a private
passway over the land of one or more persons to enable him to attend courts,
elections, a meeting house, a mill, a warehouse, ferry, or a railway depot,
most convenient to his residence, commissioners shall be appointed to in-
vestigate, and, if favorable to the establishment of the passway, to recom-
mend the condemnation of a passway not to exceed twenty feet in width.
3. On the common-law doctrine, see Cooper v. Maupin (1840) 6 Mo.
624, 35 Am. Dec. 456; Ward v. Bledsoe (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 105 S. W.
(2d) 1116; Nichols v. Luce (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302;
Lewisburg v. Emerson (1927) 5 Tenn. App. 127.
4. (1902) 113 Ky. 255, 68 S. W. 125, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 132.
5. Barr v. Flynn (1886) 20 Mo. App. 383.
& Collins v. Prentice (1842) 15 Conn. 39, 38 Am. Dec. 61; Ellis v. Blue
Mountain Forest Ass'n (1898) 69 N. H. 385, 41 AtI. 856, 42 L. R. A. 570;
McKinney v. Duncan (1909) 120 Tenn. 265, 118 S. W. 683; see also cases
cited in note 3, supra.
7. See U. S. Const. Amend. V; Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 20.
8. Welston v. Dickson (1894) 38 Neb. 767, 57 N. W. 559, 22 L. R. A.
496; Dickey v. Tennison (1858) 27 Mo. 373.
9. Sherman v. Buick (1867) 32 Cal. 241, 91 Am. Dec. 577. The cases are
collected in (1892) 16 L. R. A. 81, and (1902) 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102.
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It is a general principle that one has no right of way over the land of
another when he can reach the public highway over his own land, however
convenient and useful another way might be.10 The private way statutes
contain the word "necessary" in reference to the establishment of the way,
but here the harshness of the general principle has been relieved by deci-
sions construing the legislation as contemplating a reasonable necessity,"1
probably the majority position today. Some courts, however, still hold to
the earlier requirement of strict or absolute necessity.12 Generally mere
steepness, narrowness, circuitousness, et cetera, of the way over one's own
land will not support a claim for a way over another's land;13 but if the
way over one's own land can be obtained only at the cost of labor and
expense disproportionate to the value of the property, a way should be
condemned."4
It is to be regretted that Missouri has not yet enacted a statute provid-
ing for private roads and ways. Inasmuch as the Missouri constitution re-
stricts all private ways to ways of necessity, 5 the plaintiff in the principal
case would have been remediless had the instant case arisen here. It seems
probable on the authority of Wiese v. Thien,1 6 that the courts would adopt
the rule of reasonable necessity should such a statute be passed.
F. C. S.
10. Cooper v. Maupin (1840) 6 Mo. 624, 35 Am. Dec. 456; Dorsey v.
Dorsey (1930) 153 S. E. 146, 109 W. Va. 111; Harris v. Caperton (1910)
141 Ky. 73, 132 S. W. 157; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Mason
(1930) 222 Ala. 38, 130 So. 559; Blackhausen v. Mayer (1931) 204 Wis-
286, 234 N. W. 904, 74 L. R. A. 1245.
11. Pettingil v. Porter (1864) 8 Allen (Mass.) 1, 85 Am. Dec. 671;
Crotty v. New River Coal Co. (1913) 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S. E. 233, 46 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 173. For a narrow construction of "reasonable necessity,"
see Haskell v. Wright (1873) 23 N. J. Eq. 389; Carey v. Rae (1881) 58
Cal. 159, and cases discussed in Note (1908) 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020-21.
For a more liberal construction see Myers v. Dunn (1881) 49 Conn. 71;
Camp v. Whitman (1893) 51 N. J. Eq. 467, 26 At]. 917; Grammar School v.
Jeffry's Neck Pasture (1899) 174 Mass. 572, 55 N. E. 462, holding that the
existing way must meet the requirements of the uses to which the property
may naturally be put.
12. Nichols v. Luce (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102; United States v.
Rindge (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1913) 208 Fed. 611; Hill v. Wayne, (1915)
193 Ala. 312, 325, 69 So. 445; Lapique v. Morrison (1916) 29 Cal. App.
136, 137, 154 Pac. 881; Note (1919) 5 A. L. R. 1557.
13. Vossen v. Dautel (1893) 116 Mo. 379, 22 S. W. 734; Violet v. Martin
(1922) 62 Mont. 335, 205 Pac. 221. Brady v. Correll (Tenn. App. 1936) 97
S. W. (2d) 448, is an exception, having arisen under a statute even more
liberal than the one in the principal case; in Tennessee a party need only
prove that he had no convenient outlook from his land to the highway.
14. See (1908) 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020, stating that no case has gone
so far as to deny a way by necessity when another way can be made avail-
able only at a wholly disproportionate expense; accord, Wiese v. Thien
(Me. 1919) 214 S. W. 853, 5 A. L. R. 1552.
15. Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 20; Barr v. Flynn (1886) 20 Mo. App. 383.
16. (Mo. 1919) 214 S. W. 853, 5 A. L. R. 1552.
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